I looked one
month back to my blog postings and had seen them less frequently done than in previous
months. It was not only because of other commitments I had had to do, or no
time to read and pursue the developments but for the lack of impetus to respond
to any breaking news. I have had a sense that the turbulent events, radical
overhauls have no place to take in what is going on in countries of “Arab
spring” right at the moment. The situation in five countries of sweeping
uprisings has achieved a certain balance, or stalemate, if you want to call it
as such, which could be overturned only after quantitative acquisitions slowly
piled up to generate a visible change.
NATO
declared in June that operations in Libya will continue three months more and International
Criminal Court issued orders on Kaddafi and his son Seyfu-l-Islam’s arrest.
These developments seem having no potential for final solution, except one to
enhance foreign involvement in crisis. An alternative trend was a disclosure
that has come from Muammar Kaddafi’s daughter Aisha, who told to the French press
on June 30 that direct and indirect negotiations are ongoing with oppositional Interim
National Council “to stop the bloodshed between Libyans”. Quantitative changes
that could lead to a kind of transformation of Libyan conflict might be
expected by the end of another three month term of NATO engagement, but it might
come from what is going inside the anti-Kaddafi opposition, which has recently
demonstrated some discrepancy regarding the future of Muammar Kaddafi in Libya.
In Yemen
the protestors’ struggle against President Ali Abdallah Saleh is gradually transforming
into a contest between President Saleh’s clan and the opposing clan of Bani
al-Ahmar. This transformation can make external actors more cautious to engage
and al-Qaeda led Islamic opposition inspired to grow with ambitions for power. On
what side the quantitative changes could bring more gravity is difficult to
judge.
In the third
country where the confrontation used to grow between opposition and government –
in Syria – dynamics were not in favour for the sustainability of the regime despite
many advantageous features which provided more resilience for President Bashar
Assad. Unlike Libya Syrian policy was not self contained and anchored in
Lebanon and partnership with Iran. However the US and France Ambassadors’ visit
to rebellion Hama engendered a response in a shape of violent pro-government demonstrations
in front of both missions in Damascus. This upgrade of the war of nerves has
led to yesterday statement by Hilary Clinton featuring an offensive wording
that President Assad “is not indispensible.” The limiting benchmark here is progress
of Palestinian state building. Syria
pursued well balanced policy in Middle East conflict, which brought a good reputation
in Arab eyes by its stubborn consistency and also containment of radical
militarization of the situation. The matter of Palestinian statehood might
indicate how long such counter-policy by Syria might continue working for
President Bashar Assad.
In
countries of winning revolutions – in Egypt and Tunisia - a challenge is a progress
of demanded democracy reforms. Disappointments that are gradually rising in
public expectations of interim governments might spill over in case of failure
of upcoming elections. The most important concern is whether political interests
would distort the electoral process. In Egypt elections could be marked by
triumphal legitimization of Islamic parties, and Moslem Brotherhood in
particular. Would that be tolerated internally and externally for the benefits
of electoral rights and successful cohesion of political scene?
This very
brief overview enables to conclude that the upcoming fall season could be
critical line in the evolution of Arab movement that has started in spring.
